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Section 16(b) of the Securities and
Exchange Act - Unwary Purchaser
I. BACKGROUND AND APPLICATION
A corporate officer or a majority stockholder stands in an advan-
tageous position to profit from inside information which is not avail-
able to the public. The abuses wrought by insiders in making a
"quick kill" on the market historically have been flagrant and wide-
spread,' and the necessity for proof of bad faith and actual use of
such information was a formidable obstacle to would-be litigants.
Consequently, a new mode of attack was formulated by section
16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, under the theory
that once the possibility of profit was removed such trading by
insiders would cease.'
Section 16(b) provides that benefits obtained by an insider from
transactions in equity securities of the corporation with which the
insider is affiliated4 can be recovered by the issuing corporation or by
any security holder suing in behalf of the corporation. The section
1Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156, 160 n.5 (3d Cir. 1965); Smolowe v.
Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 235 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943);
2 Loss, SECURITiES REGULATION 1037 (2d ed. 1961); Rubin & Feldman, Statutory In-
hibitions Upon Unfair Use of Corporate Information by Insiders, 95 U. PA. L. REv. 648
(1947).
2 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b):
"For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may
have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of
his relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase
and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity security of such issuer
(other than an exempted security) within any period of less than six months,
unless such security was acquired in good faith in connection with a debt
previously contracted, shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer,
irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficial owner, director,
or officer in entering into such transaction of holding the security purchased
or of not repurchasing the security sold for a period exceeding six months.
Suit to recover such profit may be instituted at law or in equity in any court
of competent jurisdiction by the issuer, or by the owner of any security
of the issuer in the name and in behalf of the issuer if the issuer shall fail or
refuse to bring such suit within sixty days after request or shall fail diligently
to prosecute the same thereafter; but no such suit shall be brought more than
two years after the date such profit was realized. This subsection shall not
be construed to cover any transaction where such beneficial owner was not
such both at the time of the purchase and sale, or the sale and purchase, of
the security involved, or any transaction or transactions which the Commission
by rules and regulations may exempt as not comprehended within the pur-
pose of this subsection."
* Cook & Feldman, Insider Trading Under the Securities Exchange Act, 66 HARv. L.
REV. 385 (1953).
4 Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 applies to "every person who
is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 10 per centum of any class of
any equity security" which is registered on a national exchange or which is required to be
registered with the Commission pursuant to § 12(g). 15 U.S.C. S 78p(a) (1965).
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deals only with "short swing" trading in which securities have been
purchased and sold (or vice versa) within a six month period, the
time when most abuses were found to have occurred. Section 16 (b)
provides a simple, effective,' mechanically applied standard.! All that
need be shown is a purchase and sale by an insider within the six
month period.
Some transactions, however, escape the coverage of section 16 (b).'
The section does not cover situations in which the insider buys and
then sells (or vice versa) exactly six months and one day later,8 or
in which the insider gives "tips" to family members or to an insider
of another corporation in return for similar information about the
other corporation.! Also, one who is an insider by virtue of his posi-
tion and who buys stock and then severs his relationship with the
issuing company does not come within the express provisions of
section 16(b)." Yet bona fide transactions by insiders involving no
unfair use of inside information have come within the ban of the
act."
5Loss, op. cit. supra note 1, at 1043. Section 12(g) now requires registration for
any issuer having total assets exceeding $1,000,000 and a class of equity security held of
record by 500 or more shareholders. Section 16(b) also applies to a person who is a director
or an officer of the issuer.
a "Congress intended the test to be an entirely objective one." Heli-Coil Corp. v.
Webster, 352 F.2d 156, 165 (2d Cir. 1965). "[T]he only remedy which its framers
deemed effective for this reform was the imposition of a liability based upon an objective
measure of proof." Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 235 (2d Cir. 1943), cert.
denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943). "Its fundamental purpose, moreover, is to make disgorging
of insiders' profits almost automatic." Rubin & Feldman, Statutory Inhibitions Upon Unfair
Use of Corporate Information by Insiders, 95 U. PA. L. RRv. 468, 473 (1947). See 40
A.L.R.2d 1358 (1955).
"Congress recognized that section 16(b) wosld not correct all the practices thought
to be evil; obviously the six month limitation alone 'let many fish out of the net' since
the tax laws tend to encourage a holding period longer than six months. The statute makes
an honest, if not honorable man out of the insider in that period." Adler v. Klawans,
267 F.2d 840, 845 (2d Cir. 1959).
8 Loss, op. cit. supra note 1, at 1042; Cole, Insiders' Liabilities Under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 12 Sw. L.J. 147, 150 n.22 (1958).
G'Ibid.
° Loss, op. cit. supra note 1, at 1060.
"In Blau v. Lehman, 286 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1960), aff'd, 368 U.S. 403 (1962), an
investment firm purchased stock in a corporation in which one of the firm's partners served
as a director. This purchase was accomplished without seeking that partner's advice, and
indeed, without his knowledge. The court held that despite his innocence and good faith,
the inside partner had to divest himself of his pro rata share of the profits made when the
firm sold the stock in the course of its business. In Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. W.R.
Stephens, 141 F. Supp. 841 (W.D. Ark. 1956), an investment dealer and broker held more
than ten percent of the shares in a corporation and later purchased more shares, largely
to fill orders of customers, who were charged the prevailing market price of shares at the
time the order was completed. The court held that brokers and dealers were not excluded
from § 16(b) and that this company must divest itself of the profits realized by the
increase in market value between the original purchase date and the date of the sale. It
should be noted that Congress has manifested its realization of the unfairness of such a
decision by passing § 16(d) which removes a dealer from the scope of § 16(b). 15 U.S.C.
§ 78p(d) (Supp. 1965). In Magida v. Continental Can Co., 231 F.2d 843 (2d Cir.
1956), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 972 (1956), a parent corporation purchased common stock
NOTES
In addition, Smolowe v. Delendo Corp." has laid down the severe
"lowest price in-highest price out" rule in which any profit real-
ized on any single pair of buy and sell transactions must go to
the issuing corporation. The shares of lowest cost to the insider will
be paired with whatever shares have been sold at the highest price
by the insider within six months of that acquisition." Thus, shares
are fungible and lose their individual identity. If the rule were other-
wise, an insider could safely speculate by maintaining a block of
stock for a period greater than six months and then disposing of
these certificates, despite the fact that he might have purchased
other shares within the six month period.
II. WESTERN AUTO SUPPLY Co. v. GAMBLE-SKOGMO, INC."'
Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., an insider corporation holding more than
ten per cent of the stock of a subsidiary, Western Auto Supply Com-
pany, purchased an additional 32,000 shares of the subsidiary for
the avowed purpose of contributing as much of this stock as would
be necessary to satisfy the insider's outstanding obligation to its
profit-sharing stock bonus trust. The exact amount of its obligation
was at that time unascertained; a week later, upon determination
of the precise amount, the insider transferred 25,942 shares, plus a
small amount of cash, to the trust. The market value of the shares
remained unchanged during this period; so no profit was realized
by the insider.' A civil anti-trust suit was later instituted against
the insider in order to force it to divest itself of its holdings in the
subsidiary. Within six months of the purchase of the 32,000 shares,
the insider sold its entire holdings in the subsidiary; the trust, how-
ever, continued to hold its shares. A successor corporation of the
subsidiary invoked section 16(b) " and demanded that the insider
of its subsidiary and within six months sold a much larger number of shares. The court
determined that the sale was made at the request of the subsidiary and was to its advantage.
Nevertheless, the court held that the parent came within the prohibitory language of
5 16(b), even though the subsidiary had in fact benefited by the transaction.
12136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 731 (1943).
" The Smolowe rule has been followed in numerous cases. Walet v. Jefferson Lake
Sulphur Co., 202 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 820 (1953); Gratz v.
Claughton, 187 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1951); Steinberg v. Sharpe, 95 F. Supp. 32 (S.D.N.Y.
1950), aff'd, 190 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1951); Blau v. Hodgkinson, 100 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y.
1951).
14 348 F.2d 736 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966).
" Western Auto Supply Co. v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 456, 460 (D. Minn.
1964).
"e The successor inherited the chose in action by virtue of statutory law, and common
law, under which a tortious claim for protection of property rights survived although the
injured party had expired. Western Auto Supply Co. v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 348 F.2d 736
(8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966).
1966]
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turn over profits obtained from 32,000 of the shares which had just
been sold by the insider. The insider surrended the profits it had re-
alized on 6,058 of the original 32,000 shares, which had not been
transferred to the trust, and denied liability for any greater
amount.
The district court held that the insider had acted merely as a
conduit in purchasing the shares for the trust; therefore, the insider
was correct in turning over to the successor only the profits it had
realized on the retained 6,058 shares. The court of appeals reversed,
holding that all the shares in the subsidiary were fungible and that
those transferred to the trust could not be segregated. The insider
was ordered to turn over to the successor profits and dividends ob-
tained by the insider from the sale of the entire 32,000 shares, plus
interest.
III. NATURE OF A "PURCHASE" AND A "SALE"
Since a violation of section 16(b) hinges upon a sale within six
months of a purchase, a matter of prime importance in Gamble-
Skogmo was whether the insider was actually a "purchaser" and
"seller" within the ambit of the act. The lower court determined
that Gamble-Skogmo, acting as a conduit, was not a "purchaser."
The court of appeals rejected the conduit argument and found that
a "purchase" had occurred.
The Securities Exchange Act broadly defines a "purchase" as in-
cluding "any contract to buy, purchase, or otherwise acquire,"1 ' and
a "sale" as "any contract to sell, or otherwise dispose of" a secur-
ity."8 These statutory definitions have been broadly applied in most
section 16(b) cases; for instance, in Park & Tilford v. Schulte,9
the court determined that a conversion of preferred to common stock
was a "purchase". However, these statutory definitions have been
tempered in a few instances. In two subsequent stock conversion
cases, heard by courts of other circuits, no "purchase" was found.
In Ferraiolo v. Newman,' the first of these, the court stated that
" 14 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (13) (1963).
115 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (14) (1963). The Commission may exempt by its rules and
regulations any situation it considers not to be within the scope of § 16(b). 15 U.S.C.
5 78p(b) (1963). However, no exemption exists for a "conduit" transaction.
'9 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947). The defendants
were the owners of the majority of the common stock and a large amount of preferred
stock of the plaintiff corporation. The corporation, which was found to be controlled by
the defendants, served notice of the redemption of the preferred, and the defendants con-
verted to the more valuable common stock and then sold this within six months of the
conversion period.
20259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959). The defendant
acquired convertible preferred stock and then became a director in the issuing corporation.
He converted the preferred stock to common stock of equal value rather than accepting
[Vol. 20
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"every transaction which can reasonably be defined as a purchase will
be so defined, if the transaction is of a kind that can possibly lend
itself to the speculation encompassed by section 16(b). '  The
second case, Blau v. Max Factor 5 Co., held that no "purchase"
had occurred since the conversion did not interrupt the continuity
of the insiders' original investment." Moreover, in two cases subse-
quent to Park & Tilford, involving gifts, section 16 (b) was held
inapplicable because no "sale" was involved.as Section 16 (b) was also
held inapplicable to an acquisition resulting from the reclassifica-
tion of shares;" nor was it held applicable to an exchange for shares
of a holding company which is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the
insider. 5
The foregoing cases dealing with the problem of "purchase" and
sale" are among the few to escape section 16 (b). These exceptional
cases dealt with conversions, gifts, a reclassification, and an exchange;
and these are clearly distinguishable from the conduit situation in
Gamble-Skogmo. However, Ferraiolo v. Newman, although a con-
version case, suggests an application wider than its limited fact situ-
ation. Its "purchase" definition implies that a subjective considera-
tion should be given to the facts of each case, and thus it might be
argued that section 16(b) should not encompass a conduit trans-
action where no opportunity for speculation exists.' But a recent
decision handed down by another circuit has discredited the New-
man case and has employed a strict, objective test." The Newman
a low redemption price. He then sold this within six months of the conversion. The court
found that no "purchase" had taken place since the preferred and the common were eco-
nomic equivalents and the conversion was in a sense involuntary because the owner would
otherwise suffer substantial economic loss. Cf. Petteys v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 246 F.
Supp. 526 (D. Minn. 1965).
21 Id. at 345. (Emphasis added.)
22342 F.2d 304 (9th Cir. 1965). Insiders traded common stock which they had held
for years for Class A stock, which had equal voting and liquidation rights with the common,
but on which the directors could declare greater dividends. They then sold this newly
acquired stock at a large profit within six months of the conversion.
2aTruncale v. Blumberg, 80 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). An insider exercised a
stock option and gave the stock to charities within six months. The insider actually profited
by the disposal because he received a tax deduction as a result of his charitable gift. The
court, however, held that there were neither "sales" nor "profits" under § 16(b). Shaw v.
Dreyfus, 172 F.2d 140 (2d. Cir. 1949) (non-charitable gifts of shares within six months
of acquisition did not constitute "sales"). However, it should be noted that in both cases
neither the donor-insider nor the donees actually sold any stock within six months of the
donor's acquisition.
"Roberts v. Eaton, 212 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 827 (1954).
The defendants were a family group which owned 45.9% of the common stock of a com-
pany. The stock holders voted to reclassify the common stock into common stock with a
lesser par value and preferred stock; this was done and thereafter the defendants sold their
stock within six months.
'
5 Blau v. Mission Corp., 212 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 1016
(1954).
26 See note 15 supra.
27Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965).
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case stands alone," and the application of its holding seems limited
to its particular fact situation. 9
IV. CONCLUSION
Gamble-Skogmo attempted unsuccessfully to avoid section 16(b)
by denying that a "purchase" and a "sale" had occurred. In light of
Smolowe, the determination that a "sale" had taken place was almost
a foregone conclusion. Since the holding in Smolowe that shares are
fungible, subsequent cases have never permitted the segregation of
particular stock certificates. Therefore, the fact that Gamble-Skog-
mo had purchased some shares and then sold any shares within a six
month period would be sufficient to raise section 16(b) liability,
despite the fact that the share certificates disposed of were actually
different from those acquired less than six months before.
The question of whether a "purchase" had occurred is more diffi-
cult. For several reasons, the finding of a "purchase" was a correct
one. First, as has been pointed out, the fact situation in Gamble-
Skogmo does not fit within those of the few cases previously dis-
cussed which have determined that no "purchase" had occurred.
Second, it appears that Gamble-Skogmo could not have availed itself
of the lenient, subjective "purchase" definition laid down by the
Newman case because there was a chance for speculation; Gamble-
Skogmo was not required to satisfy its obligation via a transfer of
stock, 9 and under certain circumstances it might have decided to re-
tain the entire 32,000 shares. Also, there might have been some ad-
vantage realized by Gamble-Skogmo through increased control of
the subsidiary due to the vesting of a large block of shares in a non-
adverse trust fund. Moreover, the conduit argument" posed by
Gamble-Skogmo is difficult to accept because of the inaccuracy of
" "[T]he trial courts and the courts of appeals have taken two divergent roads to what
they deem to be the same end. One road leads out of Park and Tilford; the other from
Ferraiolo v. Newman. The test of the first is very largely objective; the second, in part
at least, seems subjective . . . . Congress intended the test to be an entirely objective one."
Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156, 164-165 (3d Cir. 1965).
29,"No good purpose would be achieved in attempting to reconcile Park and Tilford,
Inc. v. Schulte and Ferraiolo v. Newman . . . . Obviously, the facts in those two cases are
different. The more recent cases have tended to follow the stricter rule laid down in Park
and Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte . Petteys v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 246 F. Supp. 526,
529 (D. Minn. 1965).
3' Western Auto Supply Co. v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 348 F.2d 736, 742 (8th Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966).
" The Securities and Exchange Commission, in its amicus curiae brief, stated that if
Gamble-Skogmo had not been so careless in determining the amount of its indebtedness,
the Commission might not have found any objection to the transaction. Western Auto
Supply Company v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 348 F.2d 736, 745 n.1 (8th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1965).
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the amount of stock deemed to be needed-the 6,058 "extra" shares
were worth approximately $196,000.12 It is not known why Gamble-
Skogmo did not wait to determine exactly what its obligation was
before purchasing any shares.
This decision is admittedly a harsh one, especially since there might
have been some coercion to sell due to the anti-trust proceeding
against Gamble-Skogmo. However, since Gamble-Skogmo did not
represent a pure conduit, and because of the formidable difficulties
presented by a subjective test for guilt, one must conclude that the
mechanical, objective application of section 16 (b) here was a proper
one.
Gerald William Ostarch
3' The 32,000 shares were purchased at $32.35 per share. Id. at 738. The 6,058 shares,
therefore, cost $195,976.30.
' However, in Petteys v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 246 F. Supp. 526 (D. Minn. 1965),
a conversion case, the court found § 16(b) liability without regard to whether the
acquisition of stock by the insider was voluntary or involuntary.
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